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This position paper considers the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) concluded on 2 
February 2017 between Italy and Libya intended to strengthen their cooperation in the areas 
of, inter alia, illegal immigration and human trafficking. Under the MoU, Italy provided Libyan 
authorities of the Government of National Accord, and specifically the Libyan Coast Guard 
(LCG), with different forms of support to strengthen its ability to perform rescue missions and 
intercept migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Following the MoU, Italy’s 
support has enabled the LCG to intercept an increasing number of migrants trying to cross the 
Mediterranean Sea and return them to Libya. 
This paper concludes that the empowerment of the LCG came at the expense of migrants’ 
human rights. Migrants rescued at sea have been and are subjected to various forms of 
mistreatment by both the LCG and the guards of the detention centres where migrants are 
later transferred after disembarking in Libya. In particular, migrants are subjected to various 
forms of ill-treatment, including arbitrary arrest, torture, inhumane treatment and sexual 
violence. Furthermore, the very Libyan authorities that are supposed to counter human 
trafficking, including the LCG, have been directly implicated in the business of trafficking of 
migrants. Despite their awareness of the abuses faced by migrants rescued at sea by the LCG, 
the Italian authorities have not undertaken any measures to prevent further human rights 
violations. In fact, the MoU was tacitly renewed in February 2020. 
These ongoing violations renders Italy’s position, and the MoU itself, untenable. Italy is 
currently in violation of its human rights obligations through a policy of externalisation. While 
the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs has on numerous occasions committed to negotiate 
amendments to the MoU to strengthen the overall human rights compliance aspect of the 
agreement, there is no information to date concerning the progress or the result of such 
negotiations. The MoU remains unchanged. 
The conduct of Libyan authorities and the mistreatment of migrants exposes Italy to 
international responsibility based on its cooperation pursuant to the MoU. These include 
violations of the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and possibly 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The Italian Government’s material support for the 
Libyan authorities, without due regard for the human rights of those whom their actions affect, 
further undermines Italy’s own international obligations. Moreover, the mistreatment against 
migrants may qualify as war crimes and engage the personal criminal responsibility of the 
Italian agents who materially provided assistance to the Libyan authorities. 
This paper recommends that Italy’s cooperation with Libya must be reframed consistently with 
its human rights obligations and in light of the recommendations of different international 
organisations (including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee 
Against Torture, and the Council of Europe). Two options are outlined to ensure Italy is in 
compliance with its international obligations.  
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First, Italy may undertake to amend the current MoU to include a provision (a human rights 
clause) which specifies that the respect of human rights, and possibly international 
humanitarian law, as an essential element of the respective treaty. The provision must allow 
the parties to suspend or terminate the treaty in case of persistent violations of the clause and 
should incorporate, at a minimum: 
1. The establishment of an independent body or organ in charge of monitoring and 
evaluation of human rights and international humanitarian law compliance by the 
parties in the execution of the MoU; 
2. A list of mitigating measures which parties may seek in the event of human rights 
violations to address such violations and ensure non-repetition; 
3. Implementation of a legal framework to facilitate effective access to justice to those 
who suffered human rights violations connected to Italian support on the basis of the 
MoU; 
Second, if amendments consistent with these principles cannot be introduced in the MoU, the 
only possibility left to ensure that Italy is not held responsible for the human rights violations 
committed by the Libyan authorities would be to terminate or suspend the MoU. Indeed, the 
Libyan authorities’ involvement in human trafficking and in the blatant disrespect of migrants’ 
human rights qualifies as a violation of the Articles 1, 2 and 5 of the MoU. Such violations may 
justify the termination or suspension of the agreement pursuant to Article 60 of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law Treaties. Furthermore, Italy’s mere notification of its intention to 
terminate or suspend the MoU may create the necessary leverage to pressure or induce the 
Libyan authorities to agree to amendments to the MoU that would be consistent with Italy’s 





This report outlines Italy’s international responsibility arising from potential human rights 
violations stemming from the execution of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)1 
concluded on 2 February 2017 between Italy and Libya intended to strengthen their 
cooperation in the areas of, inter alia, illegal immigration and human trafficking.  
The report further outlines possible amendments to the MoU to ensure that any form of 
cooperation with Libya in the field of migration and countering human trafficking is carried out 
consistently with international human rights standards. 
The analysis is divided into four sections, namely: (i) legal and factual appraisal concerning the 
MoU and its implementation; (ii) Italy’s potential responsibility derived from Libya’s human 
rights violations; (iii) suggestions for possible amendments to the MoU in light of the 
recommendations of international organisations; and (iv) suspension/termination of the MoU, 
particularly whether Libya’s failure to abide by the obligations of the MoU can be qualified as a 
material breach within the scope of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).  
b. Background 
Each year thousands of people depart from Libya and try to cross the Mediterranean to reach 
Europe. This is often referred to as the Central Mediterranean Route. Many of these people 
take this journey in order to improve their social and economic conditions (economic migrants) 
while others move to escape from conflict and persecution (asylum seekers).2   
For years, both the migration policies and political situation of Libya have had a significant 
impact on the increasing number of migrants. In the early 2000s, Libya abandoned its 
traditional open-door policy towards migration in light of the pressure from the European 
countries concerned about the flow of illegal migration reaching their coasts.3 This led to the 
introduction of visa requirements, as well as detention/deportation policies vis-à-vis migrants 
arriving or transiting through Libya.4  
Italy, as one of the most affected countries by the migrant flow, concluded with Libya between 
2007 and 2009 several agreements leading to “pushback” operations, where Italian authorities, 
                                                 
1 Memorandum d'intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo dello sviluppo, del contrasto all'immigrazione illegale, al 
traffico di esseri umani, al contrabbando e sul rafforzamento della sicurezza delle frontiere tra Io Stato della Libia e 
la Repubblica Italiana, 2 February 2017 (“MoU”). 
2 For the purpose of the present analysis economic migrants and asylum seekers will be referred comprehensively 
as “migrants”. 
3 United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), “Detained and Dehumanised” Report on Human Rights 
Abuses Against Migrants in Libya, 13 December 2016 (“2016 UNSMIL Report”), p.5. 
4 2016 UNSMIL Report, p.5 
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in coordination with the Libyan Government, intercepted migrants crossing the Mediterranean 
sea and returned these individuals to Libya.5 In 2012, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) found that pushback operations were in violation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) on the basis that they were inconsistent with the prohibition of non-
refoulement and collective expulsion.6 
In 2011, following the vacuum of power created by the fall of the Gaddafi regime, Libya’s 
security situation led to an ever greater flow of migrants departing from Libyan territory.7 For 
example, between 2013 and 2014, the number of migrants who passed through the Central 
Mediterranean Route and reached Europe increased by 376 percent.8 According to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2016, the number of migrants who 
arrived in Italy through the Central Mediterranean Route was 181,436, out of which 90% 
departed from Libya.9  
In response to the dramatic increase in migration flows and the growing numbers of casualties 
due to shipwrecks, in 2013 the Italian Government launched Operation Mare Nostrum, a 
military and humanitarian operation aimed at tackling the emergency in the Strait of Sicily.10 
The mandate of Operation Mare Nostrum was primarily of a humanitarian nature. Between 18 
October 2013 and 31 October 2014, Mare Nostrum rescued around 150 000 in Libyan and 
international waters.11Following the termination of Mare Nostrum, the efforts of Italy and the 
European Union (EU) gradually shifted from rescue activities to activities aimed at countering 
human smuggling and trafficking in order to reduce the arrivals along the Central 
Mediterranean Route.12  
In this regard, the MoU signed by Italy and Libya in 2017 whereby Italy commits to “providing 
technical and financial support to Libyan institutions engaged in combatting irregular 
migration” in order to “stem the illegal migrants’ fluxes” departing from Libya is an integral part 
of such efforts.13  
                                                 
5 UNHCR, Submission by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the Case of Hirsi and 
Others v. Italy (Application no. 27765/09), European Court of Human Rights, 29 March 2011, para.2.1.1. 
6 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, ECHR 2012 (“Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy”). 
7 2016 UNSMIL Report, p.5.  
8 Altai Consulting, Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots, prepared by Altai Consulting 
for IOM MENA Regional Office, June 2015, p.11. 
9 UNHCR Bureau for Europe, Desperate Journeys, Refugees and migrants entering and crossing Europe via the 
Mediterranean and Western Balkans routes, February 2017, p.6. 
10 UNSMIL, Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya 20 
December 2018 (“2018 UNSMIL Report”), p.13.  
11 2018 UNSMIL Report, p.13.  
12 2018 UNSMIL Report, pp.13-16. Specifically, from November 2014, the EU launched a series of maritime and 
border patrol operations, including Operation Triton (2014), EUNAVFOR MED, known as Operation Sophia (2015), 
Themis (2018), Operation Irini (2020). See European Council, Council of European Union, Saving lives at sea and 
targeting criminal networks available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/saving-
lives-at-sea/; United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to 
Resolution 1973 (2011), S/2021/229, 8 March 2021 (“2021 Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya”), Annex 17. 
13 MoU. 
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II. Legal and Factual Appraisal 
a. The MoU 
On 2 February 2017, Italy signed a MoU with Libya to strengthen their cooperation in 
combatting the phenomena of illegal immigration, human trafficking, fuel smuggling and 
terrorism. In the preamble, the MoU clarifies Italy’s and Libya’s determination to address the 
question of clandestine migrants crossing Libya to reach Europe through the creation of 
temporary detention reception camps in Libya, which are to be placed under the control of the 
Libyan Ministry of Home Affairs.14 
According to Article 1(A) of the MoU, Italy and Libya committed to set up cooperation programs 
to support security and military forces to stem the flow of illegal migration and to address the 
consequences thereof. In this context, Italy agreed to provide technical and technological 
support to the particular Libyan authorities responsible for tackling illegal immigration, 
including the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) and the relevant organs of the Libyan Ministry of Home 
Affairs (Article 1(C) of the MoU). 
Under Article 2 of the MoU, Italy and Libya committed to: (i) train the Libyan authorities in 
charge of the reception centres accommodating migrants (Article 2(3) of the MoU); and (ii) 
support relevant research centres to identify the most appropriate methods to address the 
problem of clandestine immigration and human trafficking (Article 2(3) of the MoU). 
Article 5 of the MoU requires both parties to interpret and apply the MoU consistently with the 
international obligations and the human rights agreements to which the two parties are bound. 
b. Human rights implications of the MoU 
Following the adoption of the MoU, Italy provided various forms of support to the Libyan 
authorities, specifically the LCG, to strengthen its ability to perform rescue missions and 
intercept migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea. This support has included: (i) 
the provision of fast patrol boats to the LCG;15 (ii) the provision of technology to set up a Joint 
Rescue Coordination Centre;16 (iii) training of LCG personnel in charge of such rescue 
missions;17 and (iv) deploying an Italian Navy vessel in charge of providing support to LCG 
                                                 
14 MoU, preamble.  
15 See, e.g., Ambasciata d’Italia, Scambio di note concernente la cessione al Governo libico di dieci unita’ navali 
“CLASSE 500” per il pattugliamento costiero, Nota Verbale n.1440, 16 May 2019 (“Italian Embassy Note Verbale 
No. 1440/2019”), para.1. 
16 Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Relazione analitica sulle missioni internazionali in corso e sullo stato degli 
interventi di cooperazione allo sviluppo a sostegno dei processi di pace e di stabilizzazione deliberata dal Consiglio 
dei ministri il 28 dicembre 2017, DOC. CCL-bis, N. 1, 28 December 2017 (“2017 Italian Council of Ministers 
Analytical Report on International Missions”), Scheda 36, pp.101, 192. 
17 2017 Italian Council of Ministers Analytical Report on International Missions, Scheda 24, pp.75-76. 
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operations.18 The information available also indicates that Italian Navy officers based in Libya 
took or continue to take part in the coordination of rescue operations performed by the LCG.19 
Italy’s support in furtherance of the MoU has reportedly boosted the capacity of the LCG to 
carry out rescue missions and intercept an increasing number of migrants attempting to cross 
the Mediterranean Sea.20 In 2015, the LCG’s operations and rescue missions encompassed only 
around 0.5% of the total number of migrants rescued at sea (roughly 800 persons). By contrast, 
the figures provided by UNSMIL and the UNHCR indicate that between January 2017 and 
November 2020, LCG intercepted around 50,000 migrants, all of whom later disembarked in 
Libya.21 
However, it has been widely reported that in the context of the LCG’s operations, migrants 
have been subjected to various forms of mistreatment. Mistreatment has been reportedly 
carried out by both the LCG and the various Libyan armed groups in charge of the detention 
centres where they are transferred once the migrants are returned to Libya. According to the 
UNSMIL, during rescue operations the LCG engaged in aggressive behaviour against migrants 
intercepted at sea, mistreating and violating the human rights of the very persons that they 
were supposed to rescue.22 Such mistreatment has included physical abuse, threats, use of 
firearms and dangerous manoeuvres during rescue operations.23  
Migrants have also been subjected to further serious human rights violations once the LCG have 
returned them to Libya.24 Most of the detentions camps where migrants are transferred upon 
disembarkation (the reception centres referred to in Article 2 of the MoU) are nominally under 
the control of the Department Combatting Illegal Migration (DCIM), which is part of the Libyan 
Ministry of Interior. However, these are in fact under the control of armed groups taking active 
part in the ongoing hostilities in Libya.25 The conditions of detention in these camps have been 
described as “appalling”, “nightmarish” and “cruel, inhuman and degrading”.26 
                                                 
18 2017 Italian Council of Ministers Analytical Report on International Missions, Scheda 36, pp.101. 
19 Tribunale di Catania, Sezione del Giudice per le Indagini Preliminari, N.3476/18 RGNR - 2474/18 R.G.GIP, Decreto 
di Convalida e di Sequestro Preventivo, 27 March 2018, pp.3-4.  
20 2021 Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya, para.41.  
21 UNSMIL, Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya, Migration report from January 
2017 to 30 September 2018, December 2018, p.1; UNHCR, Libya: Activities at Disembarkation, monthly update, 
December 2018, p.1; UNHCR, UNHCR Update Libya, 3 January 2020, p.1; UNHCR, UNHCR Update Libya, 6 
November 2020, p.1.  
22 See, e.g., 2018 UNSMIL Report, pp.36-38. See also UNHCR, UNHCR Position on the Designations of Libya as a Safe 
Third Country and as a place of Safety for the Purpose of Disembarkation Following Rescue at Sea, September 2020 
(“2020 UNHCR Position on Libya as a Safe Third Country”), para.14.   
23 2018 UNSMIL Report, pp.36-38; 2020 UNHCR Position on Libya as a Safe Third Country, para.14.   
24 2021 Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya, para.42. 
25 2018 UNSMIL Report, pp.38-39. 
26 UNHCR, Submission by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the case of S.S. and 
Others. v. Italy (Appl. No. 21660/18) before the European Court of Human Rights, 14 November 2019 (“2019 
UNHCR Submission in S.S. v. Italy”), para.2.5.  
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UNHCR has concluded that the camps to which it had access did not meet international 
standards.27 In the Report “Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of 
migrants and refugees in Libya”, UNSMIL also observed that in detention camps migrants 
intercepted at sea live in dire conditions28 and are subject to systematic forms of torture and ill-
treatment, arbitrary detention, sexual violence, and forced labour.29 These findings have been 
confirmed by the UNHCR30 and NGOs such as Amnesty International31 and Human Rights 
Watch.32 Additionally, migrants in such detention centres are also exposed to violence 
emanating from the ongoing armed conflict in Libya. On 2 July 2019, for instance, the DCIM 
detention centre in Tajoura was hit by two airstrikes which resulted in the killing of at least 53 
migrants held there.33 
Likewise, UN bodies’ reports implicate the Libyan authorities, including LCG and the armed 
groups in charge of the migrant detention in these camps, of smuggling or trafficking of 
migrants and refugees.34 On 16 June 2020, such allegations have been also confirmed by the US 
State Department, which stated that  
There were anecdotal reports that DCIM staff at detention centers 
contracted armed groups and militias—some of whom likely had 
ties to human trafficking networks—to provide security services at 
individual detention centers. Anecdotal reports also suggested 
staff in some GNA-affiliated migrant detention centers in western 
Libya sold detainees to local armed groups to transport and clean 
weapons. […] In western Libya, numerous armed groups, including 
some GNA-aligned units, continued to be involved in the trafficking 
of detained migrants and benefited from extortion payments sent 
by the migrants’ family members for the migrants’ release. In 
addition, some LCG units, which were under the authority of the 
MOD, were allegedly composed of former human traffickers and 
smugglers or coordinated with groups involved in human 
trafficking, human smuggling, and other crimes. […] Elements of 
the LCG reportedly work with armed groups and other criminals, 
including traffickers, to exploit migrants for profit. There are 
financial incentives for smugglers and traffickers to prevent the 
                                                 
27 2019 UNHCR Submission in S.S. v. Italy, para.2.5. 
28 2018 UNSMIL Report, pp.42-44. 
29 2018 UNSMIL Report, pp.44-50. 
30 2020 UNHCR Position on Libya as a Safe Third Country, para. 14.   
31 Amnesty International, “Between Life and Death”: Refugees and Migrants Trapped in Libya’s Cycle of Abuse 
24 September 2020 (“2020 AI Report”), pp.27-32; Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion, Abuses 
against Europe-bound refugees and Migrants, 2017 (“2017 AI Report”), p.27. 
32 Human Rights Watch, No Escape from Hell, EU Policies Contribute to Abuse of Migrants in Libya, January 2019 
(“2019 HRW Report”), pp.35-57. 
33 UNSMIL, The airstrikes on the Daman Building Complex, including the Tajoura Detention Centre, 2 July 2019, 
para.6. 
34 2018 UNSMIL Report, p.6. 
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disembarkation of migrants transiting the Mediterranean and to 
re-transit migrants back to Libya for detention and further 
exploitation.35 
The UNHCR relied on these findings of the US State Department to conclude that Libya cannot 
be designated as a place of safety for the purpose of receiving migrants following their rescue 
at sea.36 
The Al-Nasr detention camp, situated in al-Zawiya on the Libyan west coast, provides an 
example of the involvement in human trafficking of the Libyan authorities in charge of the 
rescue/detention of migrants in Libya. Al-Nasr is a migrant detention centre which is nominally 
under the control of the DCIM, but run by an armed group, the Shuhada al-Nasr Brigade. On 28 
May 2020, the Tribunale di Messina found that migrants imprisoned in this camp were 
subjected to numerous forms of ill-treatment, including torture, rape, extortion, physical 
abuses, forced labour and murder.37  
In various passages, the judgment of the Tribunale di Messina confirms the ties between the 
organisation in charge of the Al-Nasr detention camp and human traffickers. Migrants were 
routinely mistreated and tortured to extort money from them, which could be paid in exchange 
for their freedom. Those who could not afford to pay were killed or sold to other human 
traffickers.38  In some cases, migrants were freed and then kidnapped again by the same people 
in charge of the Al-Nasr detention camp and sent there for another period of detention.39 
The UN has also confirmed the involvement of the people in charge of the Al-Nasr detention 
centre in human trafficking. The UN Panel of Experts on Libya reported that “[m]igrants 
interviewed by the Panel identified the Al-Nasr detention centre as a primary hub for trafficking 
in western Libya”.40 According to the United Nations Security Council, the head of the LCG in 
Zawiya, Abd al Rahman al-Milad, a.k.a. Al-Bidja, colluded with Mohammed Kachlaf, the 
commander of Shuhada al-Nasr, to carry out illicit operations related to the trafficking and 
smuggling of migrants.41 According to the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, al-Milad used the 
                                                 
35 United States of America, Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking 
in Persons Report 20th Edition, June 2020, p.548 (pdf page numbers - the pages of the Report are not numbered).  
36 2020 UNHCR Position on Libya as a Safe Third Country, paras.13, 33-34. 
37 Tribunale di Messina, Sentenza n.149/2020, 28 Maggio 2020 (“Tribunale di Messina Judgment”). The judgment 
confirms the numerous allegations levelled by the United Nations and various NGOs oftorture and ill-treatments 
including extortion, sexual exploitation, violence, and starvation.  
38 Tribunale di Messina Judgment, para.1, p.5.  
39 Tribunale di Messina Judgment, para.3.1, p.20. 
40 United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 
1973 (2011), S/2019/914, 9 December 2019, para.57. 
41 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Committee Established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), 
Narrative Summary – Abd al Rahman al-Milad. 
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coastguard’s boat to intercept migrants at sea and transport them to Al-Nasr detention camp, 
from where they were sold again to smugglers.42 
Italy tacitly renewed the MoU despite the credible information received about the human 
rights violations committed by LCG and DCIM.43 In numerous instances between 2017 and 
2020, international and non-governmental organisations put the Italian authorities on notice of 
the abuses committed against migrants intercepted at sea by the LCG in Libyan detention 
camps and of the instrumental role of assistance provided by Italy pursuant to the MoU in this 
regard.44  
Despite such awareness, the Italian authorities failed to take any steps to prevent the further 
commission of human rights violations by the Libyan authorities in charge of migrants rescued 
at sea and placed in detention. While the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luigi di Maio, has 
committed on numerous instances to strengthen the compliance of the MoU with human rights 
law, there is no information to date concerning the progress or the result of such 
negotiations.45  
Significantly, Italy’s approach is in stark contrast with the one adopted by the UN mechanisms 
operating in Libya. In light of the allegations of human rights violations committed by the LCG 
and the DCIM, the UN bodies operating in Libya conditioned their support to these entities on 
the implementation of a series of mitigating measures aimed at ensuring Libyan authorities’ 
compliance with human rights standards.46 
  
                                                 
42 United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 
1973 (2011), S/2018/812, 5 September 2018, Annex 49, para.2; United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the 
Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011), S/2017/466, 1 June 2017, para.30, 
Annex 17, paras.3-4. 
43 2020 AI Report, p.19. 
44 Notice from international organisations include: (i) Council of Europe: CoE, Human Rights Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Letter to Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Luigi Di Maio, CommHR/DM/sf 006-2020, 13 
February 2020 (“2020 CoE Human Rights Commissioner Letter”); CoE, Human Rights Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Letter to Italian Minister of the Interior Mr Marco Minniti, CommHR/INM/sf 0345-2017, 28 September 
2017; and (ii) United Nations: 2018 UNSMIL Report, Recommendations, p.53; UN Committee against Torture, 
Concluding observations on the fifth and sixth periodic reports of Italy, CAT/C/ITA/CO/5-6, 17 December 2017, 
para.22. Notice from non-governmental organisations include: (i) Amnesty International: 2020 AI Report, p.12; 
2017 AI Report, p.11; (ii) Human Rights Watch: 2019 HRW Report, p.9. The debate in the Italian Parliament 
concerning the Italian mission in Libya also reflects a full awareness of the condition of detention of migrants in 
Libya and of the role that Italy is having in this regard. See, e.g. Senato della Repubblica, XVIII Legislatura, 236 
Seduta, Resoconto Stenografico, 7 July 2020, pp.20-21 (De Falco), 26-27 (Bonino), 40-42 (De Petris); Senato della 
Repubblica, XVIII Legislatura, 130 Seduta, Resoconto Stenografico, 9 July 2019, pp.36-37 (Bonino), 51-54 
(Verducci), 71-72 (Petrocelli). See also 2017 AI Report, pp.56-59. 
45 2020 AI Report, p.19. 
46 2018 UNSMIL Report, pp.18-19. 
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III. Italy’s potential responsibility derived from Libya’s human rights violations  
The abuses migrants are subjected to in Libya may result in violations of customary and treaty 
norms of international law. Specifically, the reports of international organisations and NGOs 
present in situ indicate that the abuses perpetrated against migrants meet the threshold 
criteria of torture under the definition of Article 1 of the UN Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and the corresponding 
provisions incorporated under Article 3 of the ECHR as well as Article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).47 In parallel, such abuses may also qualify as 
international crimes, namely torture as war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
While Libyan authorities are directly responsible for the violations committed against migrants, 
Italy’s logistical support provided on the basis of the MoU may be considered to be 
instrumental to the commission of such breaches. Accordingly, such support may, at least, 
entail the international responsibility of Italy for such internationally wrongful acts and the 
criminal responsibility of the individuals involved in those violations.  
Indeed such breaches appear to give rise to, at least, four possible types or forms of 
responsibility: (i) State responsibility stemming from aiding or assisting Libya in the commission 
of an internationally wrongful act, in accordance with Article 16 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility (ASR); (ii) State responsibility under Article 41 of the ASR; (iii) State responsibility 
for direct violation of the CAT, the ECHR, and the ICCPR; and (iv) individual criminal 
responsibility of those Italian nationals who facilitate or contribute to the commission of an 
international crime, in accordance with Article 25 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC Statute). 
a. Aiding and assisting Libya in the commission of an international wrongful 
act  
According to Article 16 of the ASR  
“A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for 
doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of 
the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally 
wrongful if committed by that State”.  
                                                 
47 For practical purposes, the present analysis focuses on the qualification of the abuses committed against 
migrants as torture and the relevant breaches of the CAT, as well as the corresponding provisions of the ECHR and 
the ICCPR. However, the abuses to which migrants are subjected in Libya may qualify as cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (Article 16 of the CAT) as well as violations of different human rights 
conventions to which Libya and Italy are parties. These include, inter alia, the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention 
for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED). If requested, an expanded analysis with 
respect to Italy’s responsibility under the relevant provisions of these conventions can be provided. 
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In the present case, Italy may be held liable for the abuses committed against migrants in Libya 
if the following four conditions are met: (i) Libya is in breach of the CAT vis-à-vis the 
mistreatments committed against migrants; (ii) Italy’s support under the MoU contributed to 
such violation of the CAT; (iii) Italy provided such support despite its knowledge that it may 
contribute to Libya’s violation of the CAT; and (iv) Libya’s violation of the CAT amounts to a 
breach of an obligation by which Italy is bound.  
Libya is in breach of the CAT. The abuses suffered by migrants in Libya are inconsistent with 
Articles 1, 2 and 5 of the CAT ratified by Libya on 16 May 1989. Such breaches amount to an 
internationally wrongful act. 
Under Article 2(1) of the CAT, States have an obligation to respect and protect the human right 
not to be subjected to torture as defined in Article 1 of the CAT.48 While Article 2 of the CAT 
requires State Parties to put in place “effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other 
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction” (positive obligation), 
this provision, read together with Article 1, also covers the right of individuals not to be 
subjected to torture (negative obligation).49 In addition, Article 5 of the CAT requires States 
Parties to establish their jurisdiction over acts of torture committed in the territories under 
their jurisdiction, including any forms of attempt, complicity and participation.  
As noted above, available information from international and non-governmental organisations 
indicates that Libya is in breach of these provisions. Specifically, UNSMIL found that migrants 
held in a number of DCIM detention centres, including those rescued at sea by the LCG, are 
“systematically subjected to torture”.50 The same conclusion is reflected in several reports 
                                                 
48 Article 1 of the CAT (“For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or 
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”). 
49 See G. Zach, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Part 
I, Substantive Articles, Article 2 Obligation to Prevent Torture, in M. Nowak, M. Birk, and G. Monina (eds.), The 
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Its Optional Protocol: A Commentary, 2nd Ed., Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2019, p.78 (“The formulation of Article 2 (1) must be interpreted as including the obligation of 
States parties to respect and protect the human right not to be subjected to torture. But the main emphasis of this 
formulation, as in Article 16, is put on the positive obligation of States parties to fulfil.”); Committee Against 
Torture, CAT/C/53/D/514/2012, Déogratias Niyonzima v Burundi, Communication No. 514/2012, para.9. In some 
cases, the Committee against Torture found that such negative obligation emanated directly from Article 1 of the 
CAT. See, e.g., Committee Against Torture, Ali Ben Salem v. Tunisia, Communication No. 269/2005, 
CAT/C/39/D/269/2005, 7 November 2007, para.16.5; Committee Against Torture, Dmytro Slyusar v Ukraine, 
Communication No. 353/2008, CAT/C/47/D/353/2008, 16 January 2011, para.9.4; and G. Zach, Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Part I, Substantive Articles, Article 1 
Definition of Torture, in M. Nowak, M. Birk, and G. Monina (eds.), The United Nations Convention Against Torture 
and Its Optional Protocol: A Commentary, 2nd Ed., Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2019, p.68. 
50 2018 UNSMIL Report, p.44. 
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issued by Amnesty International51 and Human Rights Watch.52 These reports include first-hand 
evidence of specific acts of torture routinely inflicted on migrants. These findings are fully in 
line with the judgment of the Tribunal of Messina which qualified the abuses committed against 
migrants in the Al-Nasr detention centre as torture under Article 613 bis of the Italian Criminal 
Code.53  
Against this background, Libya has not adopted any comprehensive effort to tackle such 
practices or to ensure that victims may receive redress for the violations suffered. Accordingly, 
the torture inflicted against migrants in the detention centres operated by armed groups 
together with Libya’s failure to put in place measures that can effectively prevent such 
treatment or to exercise its criminal jurisdiction thereto violates Articles 1, 2 and 5 of the CAT.  
Notably, the fact that detention centres are run by armed groups on behalf of the Minister of 
Interior does not absolve Libya of its obligations under the CAT. Indeed, the Committee against 
Torture General Comment No. 2 stipulates that, under Article 2 of the CAT, States also bear 
responsibility for the acts of individuals who act on their behalf, as in the present case.54 
Likewise, in Elmi v Australia, the Committee Against Torture concluded that non-State actors, 
who carry out State functions, such as personnel in privately-run detention facilities or de facto 
authorities exercising quasi-governmental functions, fall under the definition of persons acting 
in an official capacity.55 
Italy’s support pursuant to the MoU contributed to Libya’s violation of the CAT. Italy’s support 
under the MoU qualifies as direct assistance to Libya’s breach of the CAT. As noted above, the 
coordination, logistical support and training enabled the LCG to increase their operations and 
intercept migrants at sea.56 Once migrants have disembarked in Libya, under the auspices of 
the LCG, they are transferred to detention camps where they have then been subjected to 
torture.57 Thus, Italy’s support to the LCG contributed to Libya’s internationally wrongful act. 
Italy provided such support despite its knowledge that it may have contributed to Libya’s 
violation of the CAT. Italy has been providing logistical support to Libyan authorities despite its 
knowledge that migrants intercepted at sea and returned to Libya were subjected to torture.58 
                                                 
51 2020 AI Report, pp.29-30; 2017 AI Report, pp.31-33. 
52 2019 HRW Report, pp.1, 3, 17, 35, 39-41, 43-44. 
53 Tribunale di Messina Judgment, para.6.2, pp.38-42. 
54 Committee Against Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, General Comment No.2, CAT/C/GC/2, 24 January 2008, para.15. 
55 Committee Against Torture, Sadiq Shek Elmi v Australia, Communication No. 120/1998, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, 14 May 1999, para.6.5. See also Report by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mission to Nepal, E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.5, para.19. 
56 Section A, Legal and Factual Background. 
57 Section A, Legal and Factual Background. 
58 There is considerable academic debate on whether Article 16 of the ASR is satisfied by the knowledge of the 
other the intent of the State to commit a wrongful act or instead requires also an intention to provide aid or 
assistance in the commission of such act. See P. Pustorino, Diritto Internazionale e Complicità fra Stati: 
Considerazioni sull’elemento soggettivo dell’illecito, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, 2020, p.657; C. Dominicé, 
Attribution of Conduct to Multiple States and the Implication of a State in the Act of Another State, in J. Crawford, 
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Italy’s full awareness of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act performed by 
Libya cannot be disputed.59 
The relevant conducts in question would constitute a breach of an obligation by which Italy is 
bound if committed by Italian authorities. Italy has ratified the CAT by means of the adoption of 
Law No. 498/1988; as a result, the treaty entered into force on 12 January 1989. Accordingly, 
the obligations stemming from Articles 1, 2 and 5 of the  CAT for which Libyan authorities are 
responsible in the present case are equally applicable to Italy.  
By providing logistical support to Libyan authorities pursuant to the MoU, Italy has assisted 
Libya in breaching the CAT, in knowledge of the circumstances of such breach. Italy incurs 
responsibility under Article 16 of the ASR. As such, Italy is required to (i) cease the wrongful act 
(ASR, Article 30); and (ii) provide full reparation for the injury, whether material or moral, 
caused by its wrongful conduct (ASR, Article 31).  
b. Italy is in violation of Article 41 of the Articles on State Responsibility 
The prohibition of torture is absolute – i.e., these are imperative norms in international law that 
no State is allowed to ignore.60 The torture inflicted on migrants in Libya also represents a 
violation of a jus cogens norm.61 Accordingly, Italy’s support to Libya is in breach of Article 41(2) 
of the ASR by providing assistance in maintaining a situation in breach of a peremptory norm as 
defined by Article 40 of the ASR. Specifically, Article 41(2) establishes that “[n]o State shall 
recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of Article 40, nor 
render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.” The two obligations, non-recognition 
and non-assistance, have a “separate scope of application” and operate independently.62 
The International Law Commission clarified that the obligation not to provide aid or assistance 
to a situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm “goes beyond the provisions 
dealing with aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act” (covered by 
Article 16 of the ASR), as it “extends beyond the commission of the serious breach itself to the 
maintenance of the situation created by that breach”.63  
In this regard, besides the mere assistance to the violations of the CAT, Italy’s continuous 
support to Libyan authorities since 2017 is likely to engage its responsibility under Article 41 of 
                                                 
A. Pellet, and S. Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010, 
p.286. However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Genocide case, interpreted Article 16 as to requiring 
knowledge, rather than intent. Specifically, the ICJ concluded that a conduct can be qualified as complicity when 
the assisting State aided the acting State “in full awareness” of the latter’s intent to use the aid to commit the 
wrongful act. See ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, Judgment, 26 February 2007, paras.420-423. 






the ASR insofar as it maintained a situation in which migrants were subjected to treatment 
inconsistent with the jus cogens prohibition against torture.  
c. Italy’s support to Libyan Authorities may incur responsibility under the 
CAT, ECHR, and ICCPR 
It cannot be excluded that Italy’s support to Libyan authorities is in direct breach of its own 
obligations under the CAT, ECHR and ICCPR. Forms of support such as, inter alia, coordination 
of LCG rescue missions from Italy and Libya may trigger the extraterritorial application of these 
human rights instruments directly engaging Italy’s responsibility for the human rights violations 
committed against migrants in Libya. 
i. Extraterritorial application of the CAT 
As noted above, the CAT imposes upon States two different sets of obligations: (i) positive 
obligations: to prevent acts of torture by taking positive measures such as 
legislative/administrative measures or establishing its criminal jurisdiction (for instance Articles 
2(1), 5(1) and 7(1); and (ii) negative obligations: to refrain from committing torture (Articles 1 
and 2).64 While positive obligations, under Articles 2(1), 5(1) and 7(1) are confined to acts of 
torture occurring in the territory under the control of the State, no geographical limitation is 
indeed provided vis-à-vis the negative obligations.65  
These considerations find support in the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that specified that “States’ 
negative obligations under the Convention are not per se spatially limited or territorially 
defined, nor are its obligations to cooperate to end torture and other ill-treatment.”66 Likewise, 
according to the Committee Against Torture, the assistance provided to acts of torture 
committed outside the territory of a State can attract its responsibility under Article 2 as a form 
of complicity.67  
In line with this reasoning, even if migrants are subjected to torture in Libya by non-Italian 
nationals, Italy may still be in breach of Articles 1 and 2 of the CAT because the support 
provided under the MoU, which has contributed to the commission of these crimes.  
Assistance to LCG to intercept migrants entitled to asylum may also be inconsistent with the 
principle of non-refoulement, and in violation of the Article 3 of the CAT which provides that 
                                                 
64 M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles and Policy, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011 (“Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of HR Treaties”), pp.212, 214-215. See also Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mission to 
Tajikistan, A/HRC/22/53/Add.1, 28 January 2013, para.99. 
65 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of HR Treaties, p.215. 
66 Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, A/70/303, 7 August 2015, para.28. 
67 Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CAT/C/GBR/CO/6, 7 June 2019, para.34. 
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“[n]o State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”68 In 
this regard, financing and equipping the LCG as well as coordinating their activity during rescue 
operations, whether from Italy or Libya, suggests that Italy may be in violation of this provision 
where LCG rescue missions result in the mistreatment of migrants intercepted at sea once 
transferred back to Libyan soil.  
ii. Extraterritorial Application of the ECHR 
The support to the LCG may also give rise to the extraterritorial application of the ECHR. 
Specifically, the question of Italy’s responsibility for coordinating LCG rescue operations from 
Rome is now under consideration before the ECtHR in the case S.S. and others v. Italy.69 In this 
case, the UNHCR, acting as a third-party intervener, maintained that Italy’s obligations under 
the non-refoulement principle extended to rescue operations carried by the LCG operated in 
coordination with the Italian Navy.70 The UNHCR’s approach is in line with considerations that 
“border externalisation” policies are inconsistent with non-refoulment doctrine which applies 
also in high-seas.71   
In addition, the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR seems to cover the conduct of Italian 
officers deployed in Libya (on the basis of the MoU) in charge of coordinating the LGC rescue 
operations or performing other forms of similar support. Indeed, according to the ECtHR 
“where, in accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement, authorities of the Contracting 
State carry out executive or judicial functions on the territory of another State, the Contracting 
                                                 
68 CAT, Article 3.  
69 ECtHR, S.S. and Others v. Italy, Application No. 21660/18. 
70 2019 UNHCR Submission in S.S. v. Italy, paras.4.1-4.7, 6.1.  
71 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy. There is a considerable tension between EU migratory policies and ECtHR 
principles with respect “border externalisation”. M.-T. Gil-Bazo, The Practice of Mediterranean States in the 
context of the European Union’s Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country Concept 
Revisited, in International Journal of Refugee Law, 2006, pp.571-600. Against this background, the ‘externalisation’ 
of the borders adopted by a number of European countries seems to be inconsistent with the principles 
established by the ECtHR. M. Casas, S. Cobarrubias, J. Pickles, Stretching Borders Beyond Sovereign Territories? 
Mapping EU and Spain’s Border Externalization Policies, in Geopoliticas, 2011, pp.71-90; G. Papagianni, Forging an 
External EU Migration Policy: From Externalisation of Border Management to a Comprehensive Policy?, in 
European Journal of Migration Law, 2013, pp.283-299; T. Demmelhuber, The European Union and illegal migration 
in the southern Mediterranean: the trap of competing policy concepts, in International Journal of Human Rights, 
2011, pp.813-826. See also Answer of the Federal Government to the brief question put by Members of Parliament 
Winkler, Beck, further delegates and the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen parliamentary group – Drs. 16/2542 –, BT-Drs. 
16/2723 of 25 Sept. 2006, 6: “The rules of German and European asylum and refugee law come into effect through 
territorial contact, i.e., at or within a country's borders. The same applies, according to predominant state practice, 
to application of the non-refoulement principle in the Geneva Convention” (quoted in A. Fischer-Lescano, T. Löhr, 
and T. Tohidipur, Border Controls at Sea: Requirements under International Human Rights and Refugee Law, in 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2009, pp.256-296). 
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State may be responsible for breaches of the Convention thereby incurred, as long as the acts in 
question are attributable to it rather than to the territorial State.”72 
iii. Extraterritorial Application of the ICCPR 
The Italian Government’s direct involvement in the coordination of the LCG rescue missions, 
including other forms of support provided from Italy (training, financing and provision of boats) 
or Libya (consulting and liaising with Government of National Accord (GNA) authorities), may 
also trigger extraterritorial application of the ICCPR. This is confirmed by the “impact approach” 
to jurisdiction adopted in General Comment No.36 of the Human Rights Committee (HRC).73 
Specifically, according to General Comment No.36 States parties’ obligations under the ICCPR 
extend to those persons “located outside any territory effectively controlled by the State, 
whose right to life is nonetheless impacted by its military or other activities in a direct and 
reasonably foreseeable manner.”74 While the General Comment No.36 specifically addresses 
the right to life under Article 6 of the ICCPR the above-mentioned considerations seem to also 
apply to the other rights listed in the ICCPR, including to Article 7 (prohibition of torture).  
Such interpretation of Article 2(1) of the ICCPR was adopted, in the case S.A. and others v. Italy, 
where Italy was found responsible for violating the ICCPR for the deaths resulting from 
shipwreck of a vessel with hundreds of migrants that occurred in the Maltese SAR Zone.75 
According to the HRC, the facts that Italian authorities were contacted first by the vessel and 
that an Italian vessel was closer to the sinking vessel than any Maltese unit were sufficient to 
establish Italy’s jurisdiction.76 These circumstances created a “special relation of dependency” 
that engage Italy’s obligation under Articles 2(1) and 6 of the ICCPR.77  
The principles underpinning S.A. and others v. Italy seem, a fortiori, applicable to the 
involvement and assistance that Italy provided to Libya following the conclusion of the MoU. 
Against this background, it is undisputed that: (1) the specific active support provided by the 
Italy to Libya have a direct impact over the rights of migrants intercepted by the LCG; and (2) 
such an impact was and is foreseeable.78  
                                                 
72 See e.g. Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, § 135, ECHR 2011. See also Banković and 
Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, § 71, ECHR 2001-XII (holding that the convention applies 
the obligations stemming from the ECHR may apply extraterritorially when a Contracting State “through the 
consent, invitation or acquiescence of the local Government, exercises all or some of the public powers normally 
to be exercised by that Government.”). 
73 Human Rights Committee, CCPPR/C/CG/36, General Comment No.36 (2018) on article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, 30 October 2018 (“HRC General Comment No.36/2018”), 
para.63. 
74 HRC General Comment No.36/2018, para.63. 
75 HRC, S.A. and others v. Italy, Communication No. 3042/2017, Un Doc. CCPR/C/130/D/3042/2017, 21 January 
2021 (“S.A. v. Italy”), para.7.8. 
76 S.A. v. Italy, para.7.8. 
77 S.A. v. Italy, para.7.8. 
78 Section A, Legal and Factual Background. 
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d. Individual criminal responsibility  
The violations and abuses committed against migrants intercepted at sea by the LCG committed 
in Libyan detention centres may amount to war crimes and/or crimes against humanity under 
Articles 7 and 8 of the ICC Statute.79 This may trigger the personal responsibility of Italian 
agents which materially provided assistance to the Libyan authorities, exposing them to 
possible investigations and prosecutions carried out under the ICC framework. 
Pursuant to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011), the ICC has jurisdiction 
over, inter alia, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Libya since 2011. As 
interpreted by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Al-Werfalli case, the ICC’s jurisdiction covers crimes 
connected or “sufficiently linked” to the ongoing armed conflict.80 In this context, the ICC 
Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, stated that her office is actively involved in the investigation of, 
inter alia, crimes and abuses committed against migrants in Libya.81   
By providing support to the operations carried out by the LCG, and thus contributing to the 
return of the rescued migrants to detention centres in Libya, Italian agents can be considered to 
have assisted relevant crimes committed at such centres, within the meaning of Article 25(3)(d) 
of the ICC Statute. This article criminalises any assistance to a group with a common purpose, 
all of whom have the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a crime falling within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Article 25(3)(d)(ii) provides a residual form of responsibility under the ICC framework, covering 
assistance provided to a group with a common criminal purpose. It encompasses any form of 
contribution that may have a connection with the material (including provision of 
resources/weapons) or subjective elements of the crimes (encouragement).82 As confirmed by 
the recent jurisprudence of the ICC, any level or degree of contribution engages liability under 
this provision.83 Notably, remote or limited conduct which contributed to the crime is also 
captured by Article 25(3)(d). 
                                                 
79 See A. Pizzuti, ICC Situation on Libya: The ICC Prosecutor Should Look into Libyan Criminal Proceedings 
Concerning Crimes Committed Against Migrants, in Opinio Juris, 20 November 2020 (Url – last visited: 7 July 2021) 
(“Pizzuti, Libyan Criminal Proceedings”); L. Prosperi, The ICC (Symbolic) Investigation into Crimes Allegedly 
Committed Against Migrants in Libya, in N. Ronzitti, E. Sciso (eds.), I conflitti in Siria e Libia, Possibili equilibri e le 
sfide al diritto internazionale, Giappichelli: Torino, 2018 (“Prosperi, ICC (Symbolic) Investigation”), pp.243-264.  
80 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli, ICC-01/11-01/17, Warrant 
of arrest, 15 August 2017, para.23. 
81 See, e.g., Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 
(2011), 5 May 2020. See also Pizzuti, Libyan Criminal Proceedings; and Prosperi, ICC (Symbolic) Investigation. 
82 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, Judgement pursuant to Article 74, 7 
March 2014 (“Katanga Trial Judgment”), para.1635. 
83 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Madhi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Decision on the confirmation of charges against 
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 24 March 2016, para.27; ICC, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, 
Decision on the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, 23 March 2016, para.44. 
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Moreover, under Article 25(3)(d)(ii), the person that provides the contribution does not need to 
have intended the commission of the crime.84 Mere knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime satisfies the subjective element of the provision.85 
The logistic support provided by the Italian agents under the MoU appear to meet the 
requirements of Article 25(3)(d). Such assistance facilitated the return of migrants rescued at 
sea to the very detention centres in Libya where crimes were subsequently committed by 
armed groups (i.e., groups with common criminal purpose). While there may be no intention on 
the part of Italian authorities for such crimes to be committed, their assistance was provided 
with the knowledge that migrants would suffer such crimes after being intercepted and 
returned to Libya. The common knowledge of the conditions of detention of migrants in Libya 
leaves little doubt in this regard.86  
In conclusion, the ICC may initiate investigations against Italian officials involved in assisting and 
coordinating LCG rescue operations and find them criminally responsible under Article 
25(3)(d)(ii) ICC Statute, for complicity in war crimes and/or crimes against humanity committed 
against migrants during rescue operations and following their return to detention centres in 
Libya.  
                                                 
84 Katanga Trial Judgment, para.1638; ICC, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-ICC-01/04-01/10, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011 (“Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision”), para.289. 
85 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision, para.289. 
86 Section A, Legal and Factual Background. 
 19 
IV. Modification, termination or suspension of the MoU 
a. Necessary modifications or amendments to the MoU 
If the Government of Italy intends to continue cooperating with Libya in the area of migration 
on the basis of the present MoU, such cooperation needs to comport with its human rights 
obligations and be implemented in a manner which ensures that Italian agents will not be 
exposed to criminal responsibility for acts committed by Libyan authorities or associated 
individuals. 
Notably, since the tacit renewal of the MoU in February 2020, Mr. Luigi di Maio, the Italian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, committed to negotiate amendments to improve the human rights 
standards applied in relation to the treatment of migrants. In particular, in September 2020, a 
letter sent by Mr. Luigi di Maio to Amnesty International reflects that Italy’s efforts to negotiate 
amendments to the MoU are aimed at the progressive closure of detention centres and the 
involvement of UNHCR/IOM in the management of refugees and migrants in Libya.87 
Even if included in a revised MoU, such potential amendments do not appear to be sufficient to 
tackle the systemic nature of the human rights violations committed against migrants in Libya 
as well as the possible negative consequences in terms of Italy’s responsibility for such 
violations on the basis of such agreement.  
Indeed any form of cooperation with Libya in the field of migration needs to be contingent on 
three main pillars: (i) continued monitoring and evaluation of the human rights compliance by 
Libyan authorities; (ii) the ability to review, suspend or terminate any form of cooperation in 
case Libya fails to fulfil its human rights obligations; and (iii) a clear  commitment to provide 
effective access to justice to those who suffered human rights violations connected to the 
Italian support on the basis of the MoU. 
Such an approach is in line with the views of the Council of Europe (CoE) Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the 
Committee Against Torture. Their recommendations concerning the MoU all point towards the 
need to implement an independent monitoring system to review the conditions of migrants in 
Libya and to make Italy’s support contingent upon the Libyan authorities’ effective compliance 
with human rights standards.88 In addition, the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights included in 
her report a recommendation to establish a framework allowing for an effective redress with 
                                                 
87 2020 AI Report, p. 19. 
88 Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the fifth and sixth periodic reports of Italy, 
CAT/C/ITA/CO/5-6, 18 December 2017, paras.22-23; 2018 UNSMIL Report, pp.58-59; Commissioner for Human 
Rights of the Council of Europe, Lives saved. Rights protected. Bridging the protection gap for refugees and 
migrants in the Mediterranean, June 2019 (“2019 CoE Human Rights Commissioner Report”), pp.42, 44; 2020 CoE 
Human Rights Commissioner Letter, pp.1-2. See also Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, A 
Distress Call for Human Rights. The widening gap in migrant protection in the Mediterranean. Follow-up Report, 
March 2021 (“2021 CoE Human Rights Commissioner Report”), pp.25-26. 
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respect to any complaint of “those who nonetheless consider that the enjoyment of their rights 
has been affected by the co-operation activities.”89  
Against this background, it is evident that the mere reference in Article 5 of the MoU to 
interpret and apply the agreement consistently with human rights obligations is insufficient to 
protect migrants from being abused. By contrast a cooperation framework with Libya in the 
field of migration requires the inclusion of an effective human rights clause in a treaty that 
could be enforceable and executable during the entire course of the execution of the treaty.  
In order to be effective, a human rights clause may be framed according to the following 
considerations. 
The essential character of the human rights clause. First, the human rights clause needs to 
specify that the respect of human rights, and possibly international humanitarian law, is an 
essential element of the treaty and that the parties can suspend or terminate the treaty in case 
of persistent violation of such clause.  
Independent monitoring framework. An independent body in charge of monitoring the impact 
of the cooperation activities vis-à-vis the potential human rights violations committed by the 
parties needs to be established. Such independent body should be responsible for conducting 
an early “human rights risk assessment” of the activities encompassed by the MoU, developing 
risk mitigation strategies and monitoring the implementation of such activities to assess their 
consistency with human rights standards.  
The human rights clause needs to make explicit reference to such an independent body and its 
mandate specifying that: (i) the independent body shall act in full transparency and that the 
result of its monitoring should be public; (ii) the parties’ commit to assist such body supporting 
any request pertinent to its mandate; (iii) a timeframe for the reporting period; and (iv) failure 
of one of the parties to assist such body may result in the termination or suspension of the 
treaty. 
Mitigating measures. The human rights clause should incorporate a list of mitigating measures 
that the parties can undertake in case of human rights violations committed by the counterpart 
in order to address the violations and ensure non-repetition. Such measures may be applied 
upon recommendations of the independent monitoring body. 
Access to justice. The parties should commit to the implementation of legal framework to 
facilitate the access to justice of victims of human rights violations which arise as a 
consequence of cooperation under the MoU. 
Similar mechanisms already exist in other fields mutatis mutandis. For instance, Article 7 of the 
Arms Trade Treaty, to which Italy is party, requires the exporting state to conduct a risk 
assessment to monitor and determine whether the arms/items to be exported could be used, 
                                                 
89 2020 CoE Human Rights Commissioner Letter, pp.1-2. See also 2019 CoE Human Rights Commissioner Report, 
p.42; 2021 CoE Human Rights Commissioner Report”), pp.25-.26 
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inter alia, to commit and facilitate violations of human rights law and international 
humanitarian law.90 If such risk exists, the exporting state shall consider implementing 
measures to mitigate such risk or, in case of an “overriding risk” of any of such violations, opting 
not to authorise the export of the arms.91  
More on point with respect the present case is the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on 
Support for Non-United Nations Security Forces (HRDDP).92 The HRDDP was developed in 
March 2013 as a mechanism to ensure that any support that the UN provides to non-United 
Nations forces is consistent with “its obligations to respect, promote and encourage respect for 
international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.”93  
According to the HRDDP, any support provided to non-UN security forces is contingent on an 
assessment of the potential risk/benefits of such support, taking into consideration a number of 
factors, including the human rights record of the institution/individuals which are to receive 
their support and the existence of procedures adequate to address possible violations.94 Once 
support is provided, the relevant UN entity involved is required to assess the impact of its 
support and to establish a mechanism for monitoring “the recipient’s behaviour to detect grave 
violations of humanitarian, human rights and refugee law”.95 Mitigating measures have to be 
put in place in case the UN receives information that the recipient of the support is committing 
grave violations of humanitarian, human rights and/or refugee law.96 If such violations 
continue, then the UN will suspend its support.97  
b. Termination or suspension of the MoU due to human rights violations 
In the absence of any agreements between Italy and Libya to incorporate amendments in the 
MoU such as those described above, the only remaining alternative for Italy is to terminate or 
suspend the agreement.  
As explained above, the conduct of Libyan authorities and the mistreatment of migrants expose 
Italy and/or its agents to international responsibility by virtue of Italy’s cooperation pursuant to 
                                                 
90 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 7(1)(b)(i), (ii). 
91 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 7(2), (3). 
92 United Nations General Assembly, Identical Letters dated 25 February 2013 from the Secretary-General 
Addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council, A/67/775–
S/2013/110, 5 March 2013 (“2013 UNSG Letters”), Annex - Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations 
Support to non-United Nations Security Forces. 
93 2013 UNSG Letters, Annex - Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-United 
Nations Security Forces, para.1. 
94 2013 UNSG Letters, Annex - Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-United 
Nations Security Forces, para.14(a)-(c). 
95 2013 UNSG Letters, Annex - Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-United 
Nations Security Forces, para.21(c). See also ibid., para.21(d)-(g) 
96 2013 UNSG Letters, Annex - Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-United 
Nations Security Forces,  para.26. 
97 2013 UNSG Letters, Annex - Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-United 
Nations Security Forces,  para.27. 
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the MoU. At the same time in the current framework, Italy is still obliged to provide such 
assistance according to Articles 1 and 2 of such agreement, without any possibility of either 
reviewing or monitoring Libya’s conduct.  
This situation renders the position of Italy unsustainable as it is caught in between two 
conflicting international obligations. On one side, Italy is bound by human rights obligations to 
prevent (and punish) acts of torture. On the other, Italy is required by the MoU to assist Libyan 
authorities irrespective of whether such assistance results in acts of torture. This leaves Italy 
vulnerable to state and individual responsibility under international law. 
A solution to this problem is to terminate the MoU pursuant to Article 60 of the VCLT on the 
basis that Libya is violating provisions which are essential to the accomplishment of the object 
or purpose of the agreement. The human rights violations and abuses committed against 
migrants by the LCG and by those in charge of the Libyan detention centres as well as the 
involvement of such authorities and individuals in human trafficking violates the MoU, namely 
Articles 1, 2 and 5. These violations may be qualified as material breaches of the MoU pursuant 
to Article 60(3)(b) of the VCLT, entitling Italy to terminate or suspend the treaty. 
Not every violation of a treaty justifies its termination or suspension. According to Article 60 of 
the VCLT, only those violations that amount to material breaches allow for such possibility. 
Article 60(3)(b) of the VCLT defines material breaches include “[t]he violation of a provision 
essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty”. 98 In this regard, it is 
important to note that within the meaning of Article 60(3)(b) “not only “central” provisions but 
also “ancillary” provisions could be essential”.99 
Accordingly, to assess whether Italy is entitled to terminate or suspend the MoU, two questions 
need to be addressed, namely whether: (i) Libya violated the MoU; and (ii) such violations 
affect provisions that are essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the 
treaty.  
In the present case, there is no doubt that the human rights violations committed by the LCG 
and the other entities/individuals in charge of the “reception centres” are in direct breach of 
Article 5 of the MoU, which, as noted above, states that Libya and Italy have to apply and 
interpret the MoU consistently with their human rights obligations.  
                                                 
98 See also Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), Arbitration between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of 
Slovenia, Croatia v. Slovenia, Partial Award, PCA Case No. 2012-04, ICGJ 509 (PCA 2016), 30 June 2016, paras.215-
27; ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, paras.94-95; ICJ, Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 
paras.270-276. See also C. Tams, Regulating Treaty Breaches, in M. Bowman, D. Kritsiotis (eds.), Conceptual and 
Contextual Perspectives on the Modern Law of Treaties, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2018, pp.446-
449. 
99 T. Giegerich, Article 60, in O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (eds.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Springer: 
Berlin, 2018, pp.1105-1106. 
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Likewise, the engagement or collusion in human trafficking on the part of Libyan authorities is 
contrary to the overall spirit of the MoU which is aimed, inter alia, at fighting human trafficking. 
Allegations raised with respect to the Al-Nasr detention camp for example indicated that the 
armed groups in charge of the “reception centres” and some elements of the LCG, play a key 
role in trafficking. This is inconsistent with Article 2(3) of the MoU, which requires Libya to train 
and support Libyan authorities to identify the most adequate methods to address the 
clandestine immigration phenomenon and human trafficking. 
This gives rise to consider whether Libya’s violations of the MoU affect provisions that are 
essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.  As noted above, only 
violations that are essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty may 
justify its termination or suspension. The “object and purpose” of a treaty converges on the 
reasons the parties wish to conclude it, as well as the general result which they want to achieve 
through it.100 A treaty may have various objects and purposes.101 Generally, a treaty’s “object 
and purpose” may be inferred from its title and preamble – the latter is generally where the 
parties list the purposes they want to pursue through their agreement – as well as from a 
reading of the treaty as a whole.102 In some cases, the preparatory works and the parties’ 
subsequent practice may also assist in clarifying the scope of the object and purpose of a 
treaty.103 
In the present case, the collusion with human traffickers by the same Libyan authorities acting 
pursuant to the MoU defeats the object and purpose of the MoU. The title, the preamble and 
the specific provisions embodied in Article 2 of the MoU all appear to confirm that the desire to 
fight human trafficking business in Libya is a central element of the treaty and one of the main 
reasons that led to its conclusion. In this regard, the fact that the Libyan authorities and entities 
nominally in charge of combatting human trafficking instead take an active part in such illicit 
business undermines one of the main aspects of the object and purpose of the MoU. 
The same considerations apply to Libya’s violation of Article 5 of the MoU, which requires it to 
act consistently with human rights obligations which bind both parties. That fact that such a 
provision is an essential component of the MoU can be inferred from the reference in the 
preamble that Italy’s and Libya’s willingness to cooperate and implement the MoU is 
                                                 
100 M.E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Brill: Leiden/Boston, 2009 
(“Villiger, Commentary on VCLT”), p.271 (“What is meant by a treaty’s object and purpose? As in Article 31 (q.v., N. 
11), the terms are used as a combined whole and include a treaty’s aims, its nature and its end.”). See also C. 
Walter, Article 19, in O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (eds.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Springer: Berlin, 
2018 (“Walter, Article 19 VCLT”), p.289. 
101 Villiger, Commentary on VCLT, p.271. 
102 Walter, Article 19 VCLT, p.289. 
103 Walter, Article 19 VCLT, p.289; Villiger, Commentary on VCLT, p.272; ILC, Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the work of its fifty-ninth session, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2007, 
Vol. II, Part 2, Guideline 3.6.1, p.37 (“[t]he object and purpose of the treaty is to be determined in good faith, 
taking account of the terms of the treaty in their context. Recourse may also be had in particular to the title of the 
treaty, the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion and, where appropriate, the 
subsequent practice agreed upon by the parties.”). 
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articulated on the basis of their obligations deriving from international customary law and 
agreements. A review of the MoU indicates that such reference must necessarily include 
customary and treaty human rights obligations incorporated in Article 5 of the MoU. 
The importance of human rights compliance is also confirmed by official declarations 
concerning the intention of the parties and the subsequent practice of Libya and Italy in 
implementing the MoU.  
Indeed, a reference to respect for human rights is included in the Exchange of Notes of 16 May 
2019/10 June 2019 whereby, pursuant to the MoU, Italy provided Libya with 10 patrol boats to 
support LCG’s efforts to, inter alia, engage in rescue missions as well as counter illegal 
migration and human trafficking at sea.104 Paragraph 3 of the Italian Note Verbale specifies that 
Libya’s authorities are expected to deploy the vessels in accordance with international human 
rights standards.105 In reply, in the Libyan Note Verbale, Libya agreed to such terms of use vis-à-
vis the patrol boats.106 The exchange of notes confirms the pivotal role of human rights 
obligations as a parameter for the execution of the MoU. 
This conclusion is further supported by some official declarations of the then-Italian Minister of 
Interior Affairs, Marco Minniti, before the Italian Parliament and the CoE Commissioner for 
Human Rights. During a session before the Italian Parliament, the  then-Italian Minister of 
Interior Affairs emphasised the importance of the respect of human rights obligations, 
specifying that: (i) the application of the MoU had to be strictly combined with an “absolute 
and profound” respect of human rights obligations;107 and (ii) the compliance with human 
rights standards is a fundamental aspect of any agreement in which Italy enters into, especially 
when it is specified in such agreement.108 
Likewise, in his letter addressing the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights’ concerns regarding 
the human rights implications of Italy’s cooperation with the Libyan authorities pursuant to the 
MoU, Marco Minniti replied that: (i) under the MoU, Italy considered the question of human 
rights compliance to be crucial and that it was an essential component of the government 
strategy in this regard; (ii) Italy’s twofold purpose was to avoid migrants’ sea-crossing that may 
endanger their life and to guarantee the respect of international human rights standards in 
                                                 
104 Italian Embassy Note Verbale No. 1440/2019, paras.2-3. 
105 Italian Embassy Note Verbale No. 1440/2019, para.3. 
106 Scambio di Note Concernente la Cessione al Governo Libico di Dieci Unità Navali "Classe 500" per il 
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Libya; and (iii) the compliance with human rights standards is an issue that is at the core of the 
dialogue between Libya and Italy. 109 
Unilateral declarations and statements by Mr. Marco Minniti, Minister of Interior of the 
Government indicate the importance and the centrality of Article 5 of the MoU vis-à-vis its 
object and purpose. Italian support to the Libyan authorities as provided by the Articles 1 and 2 
of the MoU is contingent on their commitment to act consistently with human rights standards 
as required by Article 5 of the MoU. In other words, Article 5 of the MoU can be construed as 
the link between Italy’s intention to provide material support to the Libyan authorities and the 
manner in which such support could ultimately be used. 
By contrast, Libya’s systematic failure to comply with human rights standards as required by 
Article 5 of the MoU negates one of the preconditions for Italy to enter in such agreement, 
defeating the object and purpose of the MoU.  
In conclusion, whether considered individually or in combination, Libya’s violations of Articles 1, 
2 and 5 of the MoU can be qualified as material breaches of the MoU and therefore entitle Italy 
to act pursuant to Article 65 of the VCLT to suspend or terminate the agreement.  
This would prevent Italy from bearing responsibility for the wrongful acts committed by the 
Libyan authorities. This is important to avoid possible consequences deriving from international 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
1. Italy’s support provided on the basis of the MoU to the Libyan authorities is 
instrumental to the human rights abuses and/or war crimes suffered by migrants 
rescued at Sea by the LCG. This leads to Italy’s international responsibility for the 
violation of its human rights obligations, including under the CAT, ECHR and ICCPR and 
exposes the Italian agents to a possible investigation by the International Criminal Court. 
2. Two main courses of action are recommended to disengage Italy from such 
responsibility: 
a. Negotiating an amendment to the MoU which incorporates a human rights 
clause ensuring that the implementation of the activities provided thereto is 
contingent on the respect of human rights by both parties. A revised MoU should 
contain an enforceable human rights clause which includes  at a minimum: 
i. A clear statement that the respect of human rights and international 
humanitarian law is an essential element of the MoU; 
ii. The establishment of an independent body or organ in charge 
of monitoring and evaluation of human rights and international 
humanitarian law compliance by the parties in the execution of the MoU; 
iii. A list of mitigating measures which parties may seek in the event of 
human rights violations to address such violations and ensure non-
repetition; 
iv. Implementation of a legal framework to facilitate effective access to 
justice to those who suffered human rights violations connected to Italian 
support on the basis of the MoU; 
v. The ability for the parties to review, suspend or terminate any form of 
cooperation in case in case of persistent violation of the human rights 
clause. 
b. In the alternative, suspending or terminating the MoU pursuant to Article 60 of 
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